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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACQUELINE D. FUNK / 
Plaintiff-Appellant / Case No. 910196 
v. / 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION / Category No. 16 
Defendant-Appellee / 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court 
granting defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2 (j). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Funk filed her class action complaint on November 29, 1990, 
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the Tax Commission's 
practice of releasing state tax refunds to judgment creditors 
pursuant to a writ of garnishment. Clerk's Notation of Record, at 
1 (hereinafter "NR"). On January 24, 1991, the Tax Commission 
filed a motion to dismiss based upon four grounds: 
1 
(1) Lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies; 
(2) Failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted; 
(3) Failure to join an indispensable party; and 
(4) Failure to allege compliance with the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. NR 24. 
Plaintiff responded to the motion and a hearing was held 
before the Honorable David E. Roth on March 6, 1991. NR 89. Judge 
Roth found that the Tax Commission was authorized by statute to 
honor the garnishments and that plaintiff's complaint had failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. NR 90. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim was 
granted. The order was entered April 1, 1991 and a notice of 
appeal filed April 4, 1991. NR 93. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
(1) Whether the Tax Commission is authorized by 
statute to permit garnishment of a taxpayer's tax refund. 
(2) Whether the Tax Commission by acquiescing to garnishment 
of a tax refund violated plaintiff's rights under federal and state 
law limiting the amount of earnings subject to garnishment. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
(a) Utah Code Ann. §78-27-15; 
(b) Utah Code Ann. §78-27-16; 
(c) Utah Code Ann. §63-30-6; 
(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 64D(d)(viii); 
2 
(e) 15 U.S.C. §1673(a). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a judgment entered upon the grant of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a 
claim, the appellate court is both "obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and to 
indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor." Arrow Industries 
v. Zions First National Bank, 767 P.2d 935,936 (Utah 1988). 
Dismissal is appropriate only where it appears to a certainty that 
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
facts which could be proved in support of the claims asserted. 
Freeaard v. First West National Bank, 738 P.2d 614,616 (Utah 1987). 
The trial court's interpretation of the statute presents a question 
of law. Asav v. Wat kins, 751 P.2d 1135,1136 (Utah 1988). The 
appellate court accords conclusions of law no particular deference, 
but reviews them for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp, 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the granting of a motion to dismiss. 
Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, seeking to have 
the Tax Commission's practice of honoring garnishments of state tax 
refunds declared in violation of state law. NR 1-2,8. She sought 
an injunction from any further garnishments of future tax refunds. 
NR 8. The Tax Commission filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, 
among other things, that she had failed to state a claim upon which 
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relief could be granted. NR 24. This motion was granted by the 
district court. NR 89. 
b. Course of Proceedings 
Funk filed her complaint on November 29, 1990. NR 1. The Tax 
Commission filed a motion to dismiss on January 24, 1991 which was 
granted on March 6. 1991. NR 89. An order was entered on April 1, 
1991 and a notice of appeal filed on April 4, 1991. NR 90,93. 
c. Disposition of the Trial Court 
The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on 
the basis that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. The order was entered April 1, 1991. 
d. Relevant Facts 
Funk began this action with the filing of a verified 
complaint. Defendant has not contested the facts as alleged. 
During 1989, Funk was employed and had sufficient earnings to 
require the filing of a state income tax return. NR 5. The 
amounts withheld from Funk's earnings during 1989 resulted in an 
overpayment of state taxes in the amount of $75.30. NR 5. Funk 
filed a timely state income tax return for the 1989 tax year and 
requested a refund of $75.30. NR 5. Also during 1989, Funk was 
the defendant in litigation brought in the case of First Security 
Bank of Utah v. Jacqueline D. Funk, Civil No. 893002970CV (Weber 
County Cir. Ct., Ogden Department) which resulted in the entry of 
judgment against her in the amount of approximately $1800.00. NR 
5. On or about February 21, 1990, a writ of garnishment was issued 
by the deputy clerk of the Weber County Circuit Court directing the 
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Utah State Tax Commission as garnishee to attach Funk's state tax 
refund in the amount of $75.30. NR 5. Despite Funk's protests, 
the State Tax Commission paid over to the judgment holder all of 
her state tax refund. NR 5-6. Funk also had earnings during the 
1990 tax year from which state taxes were withheld. NR 5. At no 
time was Funk ever employed by the state of Utah or any of its 
subdivisions. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The primary issue in this case is whether the Tax Commission 
may disregard the doctrine of sovereign immunity and allow 
garnishment of state tax refunds. Funk asserts that the Tax 
Commission overstepped the bounds of its authority by becoming 
involved in private debt collection proceedings. Funk will show 
in the following pages that the state of Utah and its subdivisions 
cannot be subjected to garnishment proceedings, unless sovereign 
immunity is clearly and unequivocally waived by the state 
legislature. The statute at issue, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-15, does 
not clearly and unequivocally waive sovereign immunity so as to 
allow a judgment holder to proceed against a sovereign state. 
By acquiescing to garnishment of tax refunds, the Tax 
Commission permits creditors to circumvent restrictions on 
garnishment expressed in the Consumer Credit Protection Act and 
Rule 64D. The overpaid taxes never reached Funk and should have 
been treated as disposable earnings not subject to garnishment * 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TAX COMMISSION IS BARRED FROM HONORING WRITS OF 
GARNISHMENT, SINCE THE UTAH LEGISLATURE HAS NOT CLEARLY 
AND UNEQUIVOCALLY WAIVED SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THIS AREA, 
It has been universally established that states enjoy a 
general preservation of governmental immunity, and any exceptions 
must be clearly established by the legislature. Epting v. State, 
546 P.2d 242,244 (Utah 1976). Only the state legislature can waive 
sovereign immunity and an attempt by a state subdivision to do so 
is without legal effect. Bailey Service & Supply Corp. v. State* 
Road Comm, 533 P.2d 882,883 (Utah 1975). Although a state's 
sovereign immunity from suit is grounded in the common law, the 
Utah legislature has spelled out its preservation of general 
immunity in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-1. In introductory language, the legislature made clear that: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune 
from suit for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, 
or other governmental health care facility, 
and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical 
training program conducted in either public or 
private facilities. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 
(1) 
The language shows that the Utah legislature intended to preserve 
the state's sovereign immunity, except in those limited areas where 
it has undertaken to permit legal action. 
6 
f ^ a l proceeding '-uh^er ^t-at^ tt garnishment faces 
L - - . ->.- , does i l mer lawsuit, 
Although -is a senetdi rule d gariLdr^u... proceee . am1 illaiy 
to the ^riginai art ion between the creditor iei'tor, when the 
s - . .-^ v - • ^
 a sovereign, 
it : e ' r^ateo ; : airnu- proceeaing awju^ ,oi sovereign and 
within i *- s amb r * nnroin; t x, L h Sea Products, Ltd, v. Clipper 
Seaiuuab ^ . ,, * am,; s hmenr i 
not exist at common jaw, •s n i uhoidereo , .* ;LuLe . ?• d ^ L* 
and i- governed *y '»- ~prms of ? v st^.iit? M a r l i s h i n g it Weir 
y
 L GdiDi cixin, *. -* -:- anyone spekinq 
to serve a wx:t 01 garnishment on Jit state >;i '/'an must a m i r o n ' 
the jueptior "^  sovereign immunity show specific 
*• ' * < ^ -^  iritis i^„ - ^ .^.: «*<*_ .,>:.*. Allrea, 4,,u» 
P. 2d ^ " I , 5? 3 ; A r i ^  The Gove r rune n \ n • nunun I ty Ac * wd -
intended to hf* strictly applied to preserve sovereign immunity and 
i . *-? v~ : [im? «- . , «*-- — • >!» it- q * L _y
 : _ U t a ii 31 a 11? 
Road Comm.
 f 5 1 ! P J d * < 4 / J ; . 
The '"*x «i^«5i r.^  re 1 ies on Utah Code Ann . § 7 8 - 2 7 - I. 5 as 
lurtli I i C M I ..... , ,.;,. , • i ,, , JT i I on! garnishment; this 
reliance does not wLthstarid careful scrutiny, 'The statute, 
including the caption, provides d; follows: 
78 Salaries oi public ofiigers subject. 
to garnishment. 
The »ta te w •. .- ;.-i..
 t oounty, ci ty , town , 
district , board of education or other 
subdivision of the state, and any officer, 
board or institution, having in its possession 
or under its control any credits or other 
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personal property of, or owing any debt to, 
the defendant in any action, whether as salary 
or wages, as a public official or employee, or 
otherwise, shall be subject to attachment, 
garnishment and execution under such rights, 
remedies and procedure as are or may be made 
applicable to attachment, garnishment and 
execution, respectively, in other cases, 
except as in the next section [Section 78-27-
16) provided. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-15 (1953).1 
This enactment by the Utah legislature, the Tax Commission asserts, 
is a specific and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity to all 
garnishment actions resulting from judgment being entered against 
any Utah defendant. Funk maintains that the statute is specific 
in its language, waiving sovereign immunity only as to public 
officers. 
It is an accepted rule of statutory interpretation that a 
court must first look at the plain language of the statute to 
determine whether its meaning can be ascertained. Berube v. 
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,1038 (Utah 1989). A reading 
of the statute shows that it is, first of all, directed at the 
state of Utah or any of its subdivisions. It waives sovereign 
immunity as to any credits or other personal property under the 
control of the state owed to certain defendants. The key question 
1
 The cross referenced section provides as follows: 
78-27-16 Service of process. 
The process shall be served only upon the 
auditor of the legal subdivision garnished, 
and, in case there is no auditor, then on the 
clerk of the county, city, town, district, 
board of education, or other subdivisions of 
the state, or board of institution, and the 
answer of such auditor or clerk shall be final 
and conclusive. 
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then arises: -i ^ which - '*-'\iants ?• action d:d the 
legisJdt.ure i- - • .• . ~ -^ *..»}, submits that 
the phrase "defendant i.:, any actio* ^ :ioi:.. e< 
"as a public official -*r employee.- *therw.o* 
cone 1 udes Lhr f -^  - -»re i en immuni t y f r nm 
garnishment 01 y when \iit- «ifei«m*u.,i .c ist^c* -
of Utah <v~ - : ir offlrial , employee oi ir - ^ e similarly re L a ted 
capa< . t , , . — -] x- ^ord 
"otherwise - 4.-
legislature intended ,va*ve sovereign immuni#y not only as t 
public officer,1:, bu wnu uecuiae - -3m«nL 
debtors. 
If the meaning of the statute is not clear from its plain 
language, then - i-t. .tit**. oking to legislative 
history, or other ruies of interpretation, to determine a si a ut*r ^  
meaning, Osualo v. Aetna Life and Cas. , 608 P. 2d 242 (Utah 19 80* . 
There i s no ] egi si ati v e h i stor j per t a 1 11 i rig t 1 > thi s
 t 1 rticular 
section of the Utah .Code. A review of case law annotated under the 
section shows that it appeared I n the compiled laws as early as 
1 u'll"' "Tribune Repor ter Printing Co, v ± Homer, 1 69 I 1 70 (Utah 
1917 No history in the form of committee reports or s ta tements 
fa\ Legislators was kept by the legislature at that time, 
S revi ew :: f t:l ie earl y case law interpreting the 1 aw of 
garnishment in this area does, however, lend suppor t to Funk's 
position, for i t shows that the Court has consistently held that 
tl* .)jecti v e ::)f the 1 egi si a/tii re was to limit the exposure of 
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public entities to garnishment proceedings so as to promote a 
public policy of not becoming involved in litigation between 
private individuals. The earliest case discovered involved an 
attempted garnishment of an Ogden teacher's $190.00 salary due him 
from the Board of Education. Chamberlin v. Watters, 37 P. 566 
(Utah 1894). The Court reviewed a general garnishment statute 
found at section 3455 of the 1888 compiled laws permitting 
garnishment of a "person or corporation" and concluded that the 
legislature did not intend to include "public corporations" within 
the ambit of entities subject to garnishment. In rejecting 
garnishment of the teacher's salary, the Court observed: 
Such proceedings would not only engage such 
public corporation in much vexatious and 
expensive litigation, but would also occupy 
the time of its servants and officials in the 
management of affairs wholly foreign to the 
object of its creation, to the neglect of 
corporate duties. The interests of the public 
would thus become subservient to those of the 
private individual, and the money in the 
public treasury would be consumed at the bar 
of the courts in controversies between debtors 
and creditors, in which the public would have 
not the slightest interest... While such a 
proceeding, doubtless, would be desirable on 
the part of the creditor, to enforce his claim 
against the officer or servant of the 
corporation, yet we are of the opinion that 
public policy will not allow the corporation 
to be thus hampered in the administration of 
its affairs. Id., at 566. 
In Tribune Reporter Printing, the Court had under consideration 
whether the unearned salary of a public officer could be assigned 
and garnished. It reviewed section 3113x of the Compiled Laws of 
1907 which contained the same language as now appears in the 
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statute at Issue in this appeal # Utah Code Ann, §78-27-15. After 
nuliji] i.he yen* • .1 ' l " [<P «h i'hi H nq qarnishmerit against public 
officers, the Court observed! 
[T]this statute changes .»- general law above 
referred to as far as garnishmentsr 
attachments, and executions are concerned, and 
renders the public compensation r public 
officers subject to such proceeding id 
1 7 3 
Throughout it- consideration - .* assignment quest • 
repeated ;v refer? -•;.at;jr«-- .^ . changing * ,s*e genera, 
relar. mce^-atior of r~:b- -
officers . . .i, at -f J;ere any b*gg»:*s-
Court considered the statute as authorizing garnishment agaanso n. 
Utah L'. • .^yi - A^ressio unius est 
exclusio alterius' rejecting t;*e fjrgamt. * * hat by amend. . 
"aw relating * garnishments, the legislature also intended to 
^ <w.v -j-t *yiu»»<- -- N-eater fnr^e in 
this case. To permit, jjnushmeni : . *. *% o.^ •- ^ 
rever?' '*' "' • •"*" articulated - *.- i'*: . ncreo - ne 
invo; .fi - * *:p ina expensive 
litigatici result i:^  . .nueiidei *\ . ^_ lure. 
s
* '"Lose'w ana!oqo»is case involvinc -ir -rtem: * --* uarnish a tax 
refur .• M i^rV . ir fc further support 
re Funk's positioi In Brockelman v. Broc -I 
'
n
 Kan ]Q7<< « he United States government maintained that 
- *-• •• * nunity. The federal court 
agreed,, restating the general Jy accepted rule --- gn =s 
immune from suit except as it consent* *e *->e sued." id,*/ at ~:4 «^ 
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The court then set out a long list of cases wherein garnishment 
against the United States was rejected. The federal court made 
clear that even though the government may have subjected itself to 
garnishment proceedings for the enforcement of child support or 
alimony payments, 42 U.S.C. §659, this did not represent a general 
waiver of immunity. It held: 
The mere fact that sovereign immunity has been 
removed in this one limited area does not 
reflect a broader intent to remove sovereign 
immunity in areas not specifically provided 
for. Id., at 143. 
The court observed that IRS was not holding the refund money as an 
agent of the taxpayer. Instead, the money held by IRS remained the 
money of the United States until it was paid over to the person 
entitled to it. 
By analogy, the federal case is strongly persuasive in this 
proceeding. The state of Utah is equally immune from garnishment, 
unless the legislature has specifically provided otherwise. The 
fact that the legislature has specifically addressed the issue of 
crediting overpaid taxes in Utah Code Ann. §59-10-529 shows that 
it knew how to legislate in this area, if it chose to do so. Had 
it wished to subject tax overpayments to creditor's legal process, 
the legislature would have done so specifically.2 The 
2
 An example of how a statute permitting 
garnishment of a state in all cases can be found in the 
Washington State Code: 
State and municipal corporations subject to 
garnishment - Service of writ 
The state of Washington, all counties, cities, 
towns, school districts and other municipal 
12 
l e g i s l a t u r e ' s enac tmen t of a s t a t u t e in 1907 p e r m i t t i n g g a r n i s h m e n t 
of i J n in 1»1 I HI oltiMfi'Ti rnnnnl hn leatJ db an p x p r e s s i o n OL i n t e n t , ten 
wa ive s o v e r e i g n immunity in a l l c a s e s , Funk s Inn iHttitid i nniii i fit1" i 
t h e money of t tip s t a t e and was not sub j ec t to q a r n i s h m e n t u n t i l 
p a n J ii P I t i) In MI 
Perhaps 1 ho best state court decision on point, is Slate of. 
Arizona v. Allred, 4 2 c> P. 2d 572 (Ariz. 196?), See also Morgan v. 
Sehmid, '' H I'«I 'ill ir-l M'rmn I'Mihir Millstone Point Co. v. Rutka, 
244 A.2d 829 ii'mm l4Hd I . ami G & J Investments Corp, v, Florida 
Dept. of Health and Rehab, Services, 429 S.2d 391 (PI Amp 3 Dist • 
I'lHIi I in Allied i I fii p-r i »qii 1 nil (IMI I acp I rarl' was indebted to 
plaintiff and had also posted a bond with the Arizona state 
Commission, The plaintiff brought suit, obtained a judgment ana 
eventuaJ I y filed ii m ml I qanuu - aaai^t the state of 
Arizona After initially agreeing U; :, hp garni shiiiHi il 
Arizona reversed itself and resisted the garnishment. On appeal, 
I he /lti'/.uiia Supreiiie < lie hi I Ii il  l tip sir dtp of Arizona was not 
subject to garnishmer- "except as to the wages owed t its 
employees f fie i a Is. " "II Ii Court reviewed Arizona 
qai"n islumj»111 • n j shment of waqes owed to its 
employees anu jtl lciais- The statute, which i.s simi .lar to U tali 
Code Ann. §78-27-15, provides: 
corporations sha 1 1 be subject to garnishment 
after judgment has been entered in the 
principal action, but not before, in the 
superior and district courts, in the same 
manner and with the same effect, as provided 
in the case of other garnishees. \RSW §6-27-
040. 
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§12-1601. Salaries subject to garnishment. 
The salaries of officers, deputies, clerks 
and employees of the state or its political 
subdivisions shall be subject to garnishment 
as provided in this article, and such 
garnishment shall not be construed as against 
public policy. 
The Arizona court reiterated the rule that since the remedy 
of garnishment did not exist at common law, the state could not be 
made a garnishee without legislative sanction. Like the Utah 
Supreme Court, the Arizona Court applied the expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius maxim in reaching its decision. In other words, 
since the Arizona legislature had specifically provided for 
garnishment of wages owing to state employees, it had thereby 
excluded garnishment in other situations involving ordinary 
citizens. The same reasoning is directly applicable in this case. 
In addition to the legal maxim applied in Allred, several 
other rules of statutory interpretation deserve consideration. One 
accepted rule is expressed in the phrase, "eiusdem generis." 
meaning that a general word preceded by specific words must be 
interpreted as applying to persons of the same general class. In 
this case, the Tax Commission relies on the general word 
"otherwise" in arguing that Funk's tax return was subject to 
garnishment. However, the general word "otherwise" is preceded by 
the specific words "public official" and "employee". Applying the 
rule of eiusdem generis, it follows that "otherwise" must be 
interpreted in a way that is consistent with the preceding specific 
words. It refers, therefore, to other designations of persons who 
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are employed by the state and does not mean Utah ti i L i. zeiis in 
genei a I.. 
Another ru' , ' * here 
is ambiguity abou* * * <t\ ute e meaning, res-ur . * 
JnMcJ.nq 'c I f interpretation. Ware v, Idaho Tax Commission, 
567 P. 2d 423 (Id. 1 9P»n , , - ( i,mdl ball Lake Authority v. Island 
Ranching, 4 M P 2d 9 6 i 96S, ilo ij, <i /1 P. 2d 504 (19661 f When 
i i ii i I v HI o mliil*1 in lacking, it is permissible to look to the 
title of statute to shed Iiqhl u1 . I ! JI h( m o.. n HPI'", Lhe 
heading is eled? in Its declaration: "Salaries of Public Otticers 
i \]a rn i shinent; ' , 
The Arizona decision goes on : <**•*; 
'•or limiting garnishment proceedings against the state. The lacts 
•nsp 1 liHiitsft l veh point out the difficulty of administering 
garnishment actions , when tax overpayment,s in r i q n t f a 1 1 y I ie 1<.»11g 
to the state. Responding to a writ of garnishment is not only an 
impropei expend i. turn of state tax dollars, it also involves the 
state in the administrative tasx oi uei BIJII I in mj whoi"htjir i 111» ipfiind 
may be obligated to some other debt. The Utah statute lists a 
miji'iil'iei" i i;M >f P to w h i c h r-i s t a t e t-r-ix o v e r p a y m e n t m u s t f i r s t b e 
applied,, i n c l u d i n g o u t s t a n d i n g tux M H I H S , fines in ii'Sii M.III iiirjii to 
d victim of crime, child support and bail, Utah Code Ann. §sy-
in-S99 ,| I 99(1 J 'Should a child support obligation be delinquent but 
not yet posted by U.N;:. , , iu* sidi e oou i u v i oIdle i fin St at ute by 
honoring a garnishment ot this type, The state, by honoring such 
garnishments iikiy wo LI violate the civil rights of a taxpayer who 
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has filed jointly with the taxpayer subject to garnishment. 
Plaintiff's second claim under the Consumer Credit Protection Act 
("CCPA"), 15 U.S.C. 51673(a), raises the serious possibility that 
the state of Utah may be violating a debtor's rights by allowing 
creditors to garnish tax refunds without observing the limitations 
imposed by federal law. As the case of G&J Inc. v. HRS indicates, 
the Tax Commission's interpretation would subject even the state's 
Medicaid office to claims for money owing to a nursing home. 
Other than §78-27-15, the Tax Commission identified no 
authority in the Utah statutes where the legislature has expressly 
and unequivocally authorized garnishment of the state. Although 
Section 63-30-6 waives immunity for actions to recover property, 
it cannot be read as a waiver by the Utah legislature of immunity 
from garnishment, especially when read in connection with section 
63-30-22 which expressly prohibits garnishment against the 
governmental entity.3 Moreover, \Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm., 511 
P*.2d 1286 (Ut. 1973), which construed section 63-30-6, held that 
the Act must be strictly construed to preserve sovereign immunity. 
It cannot be inferred from legislation authorizing a state to 
be sued ex contractu, that it may also be sued in garnishment 
proceedings. G & J Inv. v. HRS, 429 S.2d at 392. There is a 
significant difference between a state being sued as a defendant 
on a contract and being sued as a garnishee. The number of cases 
in which the state may be the defendant in a contract action is 
necessarily limited, but the number of claims to which it may 
3
 See appendix for text of statutes. 
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become s u b j e c t ds a g a r n i s h e e Is a s v a s t a s t h e number of t a x p a y e r s 
Willi "t-ifjfinl l.i-Cii-*-- mil 11", I i -••i-iiii- iiidqmerit1 d e b t o r s , The H'ouii 
s h o u l d a p p l y t h e same p r i n c i p l e in L h i ,'•< i J w« «i ' ' «i • I • ^  1 • i hi -» " r n v i w 
•Commission * * o p e r a t i n g u n l a w f u l l y in honor inq g a r n i s h m e n t s u i 
c<m^> -V:I..MV I lh-» <1ef enchant i s ih t d p u b l i c o f f i c e r . 
POINT I I 
T H E TAX COMMISSION VIOLATED FOUR1 S RIGHTS 
UNDER THE CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION ACT AND 
UTAH RULE 64D BY HONORING THE GARNISHMENT 
iil i;">t].ut- in in in" ;->t-vund e l d in I.I w h e t h e r t h e T a x Control ssi on. 
violated Funk's rights -nider state JI teuerai law 1 iiaitjmj the 
amount of earnings that may be garni she- Specifically# Funk 
asserted in •- unplainl I hot I he 7a* mission's actions were 
contrary to Rule 640(d) (viii) and 15 U.S.C. Sib'' I I ij, whr h ' uiu I 
the amount of disposable earnings subject to garnishment. The 
fedei:dl liiift t'Xpiesrieu i i i i ms mnf-- r Credit Protection Act (CCPA) 
was intended to preve«" creditors from forcing a debini , if .> 
bank^io*-v by the use r^ si- jarnishment oiocedures, In re 
Kokoa^K... M ^ " 4 (1974), rhrg. 
denied, ;^ 
Congres- intended by tne CCPA to maximize the protection available 
*"• ' * ^ i ^ - - /^ir . stophei ' Supp. SH } (P ' N.*-. 
1973 Therefore, if a debtor's disposable earnings r^j i tu- w ne 
statutory minimum, no part of the salary may be garnished. 
5 e e appendix for full text of statutes. 
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There is little available case law considering whether a state 
tax refund is subject to the CCPA. The issue did arise in 
Kokoszka, supra, wherein the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, a tax refund was not 
subject to the garnishment restrictions of the federal statute. 
At first glance Kokoszka may appear to be controlling in this 
appeal, but a closer examination reveals several points which 
distinguish it. First of all, Kokoszka analyzed the issue within 
the context of the Bankruptcy Act, with the Court noting that the 
definition of "property" has been construed most generously when 
analyzed under that federal law. Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 646. The 
Court held that Congress had not enacted the CCPA with the intent 
of altering the clear purpose of the Bankruptcy Act which is to 
assemble a debtor's assets for benefit of his creditors. While 
acknowledging the important CCPA purpose of preventing creditors 
from driving debtors into bankruptcy, the Court reasoned that to 
define "disposable earnings" to include a tax refund that had 
reached the trustee's hands would "alter the delicate balance of 
a debtor's protections and obligations during the bankruptcy 
proceeding." Kokoszka,. 417 U.S. at 651. 
The facts here are significantly different. In this appeal, 
it is not a bankruptcy trustee that is seeking to retain possession 
of a tax refund pursuant to the federal bankruptcy statute. 
Rather, it is a private creditor proceeding according to a state 
garnishment statute. Unlike the tax refund in Kokoszka, the tax 
refund in this case has never been in Funk's hands. It remained 
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as money of the Tax Commission. Therefore, this Court should not 
be bound by the Kokoszka decision which considered a related issue 
in a distinguishable context. 
The tax refund in this case is disposable earnings, since it 
had its source in wages and by definition is not subject to any 
reduction for taxes. Nothing is required by law to be withheld 
from the tax refund. The fact that the disposable earnings were 
not paid out on a weekly basis, but rather accumulated as overpaid 
taxes at the Tax Commission, is not dispositive of the issue. The 
Tax Commission works in close conjunction with the employer in 
withholding taxes, unlike the situation where the property, 
traceable to wages, has left the taxing authority and been placed 
with a bank or bankruptcy trustee. Here, the withheld taxes are 
so closely connected with the employer as to remain wages for 
purposes of the CCPA. 
The source of the funds for the state tax refund is within the 
meaning of the term "earnings" as defined in 15 U.S.C. §1672 (a). 
There is no good policy reason for holding that the refund lost its 
character as "earnings" once it reached the Tax Commission's hands. 
Furthermore, since the entire refund qualifies as "disposable 
earnings" it comes within the statute. It would be unfair and a 
punishment of the wage earner who, through no fault of her own, has 
a portion of her wages set aside through income tax withholding to 
later deny her the protection of the federal CCPA. An unscrupulous 
creditor could then circumvent the CCPA by simply waiting until the 
wages reached the hands of the Tax Commission and then executing 
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on them by garnishment. Not only would this practice frustrate 
the CCPAf but it would frustrate an objective of the Utah Tax Code 
which is to encourage taxpayers to err on the side of over-
withholding. A well informed taxpayer, aware that a tax refund 
could be subject to garnishment, would likely minimize her 
deductions in order to reduce or eliminate the possibility of tax 
overpayment. The CCPA is remedial in nature and, therefore, any 
exceptions to its coverage should be strictly construed. In re 
Cedor, 337 F.Supp. 1103 (D.C. Cal. 1972), affd. 470 F.2d 996 
(1972), cert, denied 93 S.Ct. 2148, 411 U.S. 973, 36 L.Ed. 2d 697 
(1973) . 
In Hodgson v. Christopher, supra, a federal court enjoined an 
attempt by a creditor to circumvent the CCPA. The creditor argued 
in Hodgson that once a judgment debtor's paycheck had been issued 
it became personal property, thereby losing its identity as 
"earnings" for purposes of the CCPA. The North Dakota court, in 
rejecting this argument, observed: 
Regardless of whether the debtor-employee's 
wages remain accrued but unpaid, or have been 
reduced to a payroll check, whenever they 
remain in the possession of the employer, they 
are "withheld" within the context of the Act. 
Not only is this in keeping with the spirit of 
the CCPA, but it is logical. Clearly, if 
wages have not been turned over to the 
employee, they are being withheld by the 
employer. Any distinction to be drawn is in 
form only, and does not change the nature of 
the wages. 
In this case, Funk's wages had not been turned over to her. 
Although they were not being held by the employer, they were in the 
hands of the Tax Commission and could not be released to her until 
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her tax return was filed. A portion of her wages in the form of 
overpaid taxes was being "withheld" at the time the garnishment was 
issued. As the Hodgson court further noted, to adopt the argued 
for theory would permit a sheriff to wait until an employer had 
issued his payroll checks and then execute upon them, thereby 
avoiding the restrictions of the CCPA. Noting that the Act must 
be construed "in the light of common sense consistent with its 
expressed purpose and intent...." the court held the defendants' 
approach was prohibited. 
Common sense tells us that the purpose of the CCPA, to protect 
debtors from harsh garnishment procedures, would also be thwarted, 
if creditors are permitted to garnish tax refunds held by the Tax 
Commission. The fact that Funk's wages remained in the hands of 
the Commission is an important one, distinguishing this case from 
Kokoszka. The Court may find properly that the garnishment scheme 
acquiesced to by the Tax Commission violates Funk's federal rights 
under the CCPA and her state rights under Rule 64D. 
CONCLUSION 
Funk has shown that the garnishment of her state tax refund 
was done in violation of the law, since the Utah legislature has 
never clearly and unequivocally authorized such a proceeding. 
Sovereign immunity precludes the garnishment of state tax refunds. 
The Tax Commission's acquiescence permits a creditor to circumvent 
federal and state laws designed to protect debtors such as Funk. 
The Court should reverse the lower court decision and reinstate 
Funk's action. 
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APPENDIX 
63-30-6. Waiver of immunity as to actions in-
volving property. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of any property real or per-
sonal or for the possession thereof or to quiet title 
thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens 
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or 
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or 
other lien said entity may have or claim on the prop-
erty involved.
 1965 
Utah Code Annot. 56 3.-30-6 
63-30-22. Exemplary or punitive damages pro-
hibited — Governmental entity exempt 
from execution, attachment, or gar-
nishment. 
<1) (a) No judgment may be rendered against the 
governmental entity for exemplary or punitive 
damages. 
(b) The state shall pay any judgment or por-
tion of any judgment entered against a state em-
ployee in the employee's personal capacity even if 
the judgment is for or includes exemplary or pu-
nitive damages if the state would be required to 
pay the judgment under Section 63-30-36 or 
63-30-37. 
(2) Execution, attachment, or garnishment may 
not issue against a governmental entity. 1991 
Utah Code Annot. 3C3-30-22 
§ 1672* Definitions 
For the purposes of this subchapter: 
(a) The term "earnings" means compensation paid or payable for person-
al services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commission, bonus, or 
otherwise, and includes periodic payments pursuant to a pension or retire-
ment program. 
(b) The term "disposable earnings" means that part of the earnings of any 
individual remaining after the deduction from those earnings of any 
amounts required by law to be withheld. 
(c) The term "garnishment" means any legal or equitable procedure 
through which the earnings of any individual are required to be withheld for 
payment of any debt. 
(Pub.L. 90-321, Title III, § 302, May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 163.) 
1 5 U . S . C . § 1 6 7 2 
§ 1 6 7 3 . Restriction on garnishment 
Maximum allowable garnishment 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in section 
1675 of this title, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of 
an individual for any workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not 
exceed 
(1) 25 per centum of his disposable earnings for that week, or 
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week ex-
ceed thirty times the Federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by sec-
tion -206(a)(1) of Title 29 in effect at the time the earnings are payable, 
whichever is less. In the case of earnings for any pay period other than a 
week, the Secretary of Labor shall by regulation prescribe a multiple of the 
Federal minimum hourly wage equivalent in effect to that set forth in para-
graph (2). 
1 5 U . S . C . § 1 6 7 3 
(vi) A writ of garnishment attaching earnings 
for personal services shall attach only that por-
tion of the defendant's accrued and unpaid dis-
posable earnings hereinafter specified. The writ 
shall so advise the garnishee and shall direct the 
garnishee to withhold from the defendant's ac-
crued disposable earnings only the amount at-
tached pursuant to the writ Earnings for per-
sonal services shall be deemed to accrue on the 
last day of the period in which they were earned 
or to which they relate. If the writ is served be-
fore or on the date the defendant's earnings ac-
crue and before the same have been paid to the 
defendant, the writ shall be deemed to have been 
served at the time the periodic earnings accrued; 
(vn) "Earnings" or "earnings from personal 
services" means compensation paid or payable 
for personal services, whether denominated as 
wages, salary, commission, bonus, or otherwise, 
and includes periodic payments pursuant to a 
pension or retirement program. "Disposable 
earnings" means that part of a defendant's earn-
ings remaining after the deduction of all 
amounts required by law to be withheld. For pur-
poses of a garnishment to enforce payment of a 
judgment arising out of a failure to support de-
pendent children, earnings also include, in addi-
tion to those items listed above, penodic pay-
ments pursuant to insurance policies of any type, 
including unemployment compensation, insur-
ance oenefit payments, and all gam denved from 
capital, from labor, or from both combined, in-
cluding profit gained through sale or conversion 
of capital assets or as otherwise modified or 
adopted by law for the support of dependent chil-
dren 
(vin) The maximum portion of the aggregate 
disposable earnings of defendant (if an individ-
ual) becoming due the defendant which is subject 
to garnishment is the lesser of 
(A) Twenty-five per centum of defendant's 
disposable earnings (fifty per centum for a gar-
nishment to enforce payment of a judgment 
arising out of failure to support dependent chil-
dren) computed for the pay period for which 
the earnings accrued, or 
(B) The amount by which the defendant's 
aggregate disposable earnings computed for 
the pay period for which the earnings accrued 
exceeds the number of weeks in the period 
multiplied by thirty times the federal mini-
mum hourly wage prescribed by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act in effect at the time the earn-
ings are payable 
dx) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, 
the garnishee shall treat the defendant's earn-
ings becoming due from the garnishee as the de-
fendant's entire aggregate earnings for the pur-
pose of computing the sum attached by the gar-
nishment. 
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